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Abstract  
 
In psychiatry we often speak of constructing “models.”  Here we try to make sense of what such a claim 
might mean, starting with the most fundamental question:  “What is (and isn’t) a model?”.  We then discuss, 
in a concrete measurable sense, what it means for a model to be useful.  In so doing, we first identify the 
added value that a computational model can provide, in the context of accuracy and power.  We then present 
the limitations of standard statistical methods and provide suggestions for how we can expand the 
explanatory power of our analyses by reconceptualizing statistical models as dynamical systems.  Finally, 
we address the problem of model building—suggesting ways in which computational psychiatry can escape 
the potential for cognitive biases imposed by classical hypothesis-driven research, exploiting deep systems-
level information contained within neuroimaging data to advance our understanding of psychiatric 
neuroscience.     
 
 
Key Words:  control systems, circuit, psychiatry, RDoC, neuroscience, neuroimaging, fMRI, machine 
learning, generative models, system identification. 
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Introduction.    
Psychiatry frequently refers to models.   At its very basis, a model is a heuristic: a way to make sense of a 
complex set of interactions and relationships by virtue of a simple rule.  Psychiatry’s earliest models 
attempted to explain the psyche, and therefore deviations from its norms, using heuristics based on 
psychoanalytic theories on the influence of, often unconscious, childhood experiences and defense 
mechanisms (Fig. 1A).  These conceptual models persist today; for example, attachment parenting 
identifies various behavioral pathologies emerging later in life as the consequence of inadequate parental 
responsiveness during a child’s early years.   However, as psychiatry has embraced rapid gains made 
possible by noninvasive neuroimaging, most current psychiatric models now explicitly incorporate 
information about the brain, with corresponding interest in “circuits.”  These tend to integrate neural and 
psychological frameworks; for example, by describing “regulation” within region-of-interest (ROI)-scale 
systems schematically described by arrows connecting boxes representing regions associated with different 
psychologically defined functions (e.g., “fear,” “craving,” and “willpower”).     
In contrast, the term “circuit” in basic neuroscience is typically used to refer to microcircuits, in 
which biophysical processes, such as changing resting membrane potentials, modulate signal response. As 
with recent elegant work on thalamocortical adaptive sensory gating(Mease et al., 2014; Manita et al., 
2015), these can take the form of complex control processes, which are normally derived from rodent 
electrophysiology, optogenetic, and DREADDs data.  While some clinical neuroscience models (Fig. 1B) 
are also dynamical systems as defined by control systems engineering (Fig. 1C) (that is, they describe 
systems as a whole that can predict trajectories over time), the more typical use of the term circuit, as 
currently used within the clinical neuroscience literature, reflects co-activation between regions, defined by 
correlations.  These co-activated structures are actually more appropriately described as networks than 
circuits, a distinction that contributes to the conceptual divide between clinical neuroscience, basic 
neuroscience, and their computational extensions. 
The integration of human neuroimaging with computational neuroscience is comparatively recent, 
with the field today broadly consisting of three approaches that all fall within the description of dynamical 
systems. The first are bottom-up biophysical approaches that start with neurons and then extrapolate to 
aggregates and their mean field dynamics, e.g., M/EEG oscillations (e.g.,(Schurmann et al., 2007; Murray 
et al., 2018)). The second are top-down approaches, which start from emergent phenomena and try to infer 
a set of neural mechanisms that could lead to such phenomena (e.g., (Deco et al., 2011; Radulescu and 
Mujica-Parodi, 2014; Breakspear, 2017; Pillai and Jirsa, 2017)). The third, information-theoretic, approach 
investigates structural strategies by which the brain might optimize for efficiency in information 
propagation, based on considerations from graph theory/network science (e.g.,(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; 
Bassett et al., 2010; Gu et al., 2015)).  
Excellent reviews can be found in the cited references for each of the above topics.  Therefore, our 
scope here will be more general, and attempt to address two fundamental questions.  First, how does 
mainstream neuropsychiatry differ in its models as compared to more mature fields like physics, the latter 
of which are closer to control/dynamical systems as employed by computational psychiatry?   Second, what 
follows from these differences?  In so doing, we hope to “make sense” of computational psychiatry and why 
we believe it offers the potential for transformative advances for the neuropsychiatric field, both scientific 
and clinical.  
 
The danger of category errors. 
Psychiatric/psychological models have historically distinguished themselves from those in neuroscience by 
their focus on narrative (e.g., the “schizophrenogenic mother” model, in which early maternal rejection 
causes her child’s later psychotic paranoia(Morris, 2012)).  At its best, this narrative approach has allowed 
psychiatry to move beyond mere taxonomies of signs and symptoms to approach the mind in a manner that 
aims to be mechanistic and causal.  At its worst, it risks providing a satisfyingly intuitive, yet ultimately 
hollow, “just so” story with no manner of objectively confirming or disconfirming the correctness of its 
conceptual frameworks.  Unfortunately, the effects associated with unconfirmed conceptual frameworks 
aren’t localized to the specific interpretation of results that promote them but can be more generally 
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pernicious if they inform the generation and interpretation of new data.  To the degree to which a field 
permits untested models to propagate, it risks following false leads that can take generations of experiments 
to correct.   
One recent example is the psychology field’s model of oxytocin—a neuropeptide endogenously 
produced during female labor and lactation.  The conceptual model of oxytocin as a “trust drug,” was based 
on the assumption that hormonal influences on maternal bonding might extend to blind induction of “trust.”  
Behavioral (greater generosity in the face of non-reciprocal feedback(Kosfeld et al., 2005)) and 
neurobiological (weaker amygdala activation(Baumgartner et al., 2008)) responses to exogenous 
administration of oxytocin when subjects played several variations of a neuroeconomic game, as well as 
subsequent neuroimaging experiments of fear (Kirsch et al., 2005), conditioned fear (Petrovic et al., 2008), 
and fearful faces (Domes et al., 2007; Gamer et al., 2010), seemed initially to support this model.  However, 
after these results were embraced by the media and the clinical community—which went so far as to propose 
clinical trials to test the administration of oxytocin in autistic children—the oxytocin as a pro-social drug 
of love and trust model had to be radically reconsidered in the face of contradictory data.  Oxytocin does 
sometimes appear to increase trust and altruism, but it also sometimes appears to decrease them(Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009; De Dreu et al., 2010; Bartz et al., 2011; De Dreu et al., 2011; Grillon et al., 2013; 
Ne'eman et al., 2016); indeed, many of the same results used to justify the “trust” role are equally consistent 
with the attenuation of reinforcement learning(Ide et al., 2018), an alternative “model” that has nothing to 
do with “trust” per se.   
On the one hand, it is important to emphasize that the paradigm shift in understanding oxytocin 
does not represent a failure of science; the fact that the field ultimately recognized a contradiction between 
its model and subsequent data (albeit after ~1,200 published articles) is a measure of its success.  But the 
rise and fall of oxytocin as “trust drug” illustrates our dependence on models and our need to create them 
responsibly, because a flawed conceptual framework (e.g., oxytocin as “trust drug or, far more perniciously, 
the “schizophrenogenic mother”) persisted for so long precisely because it circularly restricted the kinds of 
hypotheses the field formulated in testing it.  In logic, this type of dependence on false assumptions is 
known as a category error.   If I ask a bachelor: Did you murder your wife this morning or last night? I am 
asking the wrong type of question, since the bachelor never had a wife and therefore could not have 
murdered her—at either (or indeed any) time.  If I run statistical tests on results obtained from a large group 
of bachelors and formulate “Murdered your wife this morning” as the test hypothesis and “Murdered your 
wife last night” as the null hypothesis, I am still asking the wrong type of question, and no amount of 
additional data or multivariate analyses will get us any closer to the truth.   
In an effort to avoid the “fishing expeditions” that lead to statistical errors of multiple comparisons 
(i.e., in which the probability of error associated with p-values for each test multiplies with the total number 
of tests conducted), modern psychiatry currently holds “hypothesis-driven” research as a gold standard, 
since it minimizes the number of questions asked, and therefore tests conducted.  Yet, the system being 
measured obviously doesn’t know or care how many statistical tests are being conducted on its data, and 
restricting oneself to asking a specific question when approaching a system about which we know very little 
greatly increases the inherent probability that we are asking the wrong question; i.e., committing a category 
error.  It’s as if we are trying to find a well-hidden treasure, and instead of asking its keeper, a genie:  Genie, 
where is the treasure? we ask:  Genie, is the treasure in the bedroom? The kitchen? The garden? If, in fact, 
our model of the treasure being in the house is incorrect; rather, the treasure is in a different country 
altogether (or under the sea), it will take us a very long time to guess the right question to ask.  Thus, when 
approaching a system about which we know very little, it can be more strategic, efficient, and honest to 
start by eschewing model-specific biases, because models based upon false assumptions run the risk of 
leading us (and the field) astray.  
A central argument that we will try to make here is that nearly all of psychiatry and psychiatric 
neuroscience is a system about which we still know very little, and thus its models are particularly 
vulnerable to category errors.  The source of the first, more obvious, vulnerability is the inherent difficulty 
in precisely and objectively defining its terms: measuring an individual’s “attachment” to a parent, or 
“willpower” in resisting temptation, or “trust” in a stranger, or the severity of his depression or psychosis, 
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cannot be done directly, but only in ways that make multiple (and often themselves ill-defined) secondary 
assumptions within the model, a problem only compounded by the measures’ dependence on self-report.  
This is in contrast to most measurements made in classical physics; for example, determining the 
temperature of a glass of water uses a measurement device (thermometer), whose relationship between 
inputs and outputs (temperature, movement of mercury) is both precise and mechanistic.  The second 
vulnerability, on which we will want to focus in this article, is perhaps less obvious:  the psychiatric field’s 
historical dependence on hypothesis-driven statistical analyses regularly assumes models but has largely 
neglected to develop methods for rigorously constructing, testing, and validating them.  Below, we will first 
address how models are used in other fields (e.g. physics), and why the common standard of performing 
statistical tests and evaluating the robustness of its results according to some standard threshold within the 
field (e.g., p-values) is a process that is not designed to rigorously construct, test, or validate the kind of 
models most relevant to psychiatry.  We then follow by suggesting how computational modeling of 
dynamical systems—particularly its Bayesian and generative extensions—may provide added value to 
psychiatry by providing directional guidance with both building and validating its conceptual frameworks, 
in a manner that avoids statistical problems of multiple comparison, but also avoids premature bias to 
models before they are validated.  To avoid conflating the first and second vulnerabilities, we will primarily 
use examples from functional neuroimaging, which ostensibly provide greater assurance that we know what 
we’re measuring (here assumed to be BOLD activation, produced via neurovascular coupling from neuronal 
response, with all the usual caveats regarding the reliability of neurovascular coupling and the imperfect 
signal/noise of fMRI).  However, the same principles can be extended to any modality in psychiatry, 
including behavioral models. 
 
Testing and validating models.   
Operationally, models have a unique and extraordinarily useful feature.  By including both structural (cause 
c is connected to effect e) and functional (the behavior of e changes in specific ways as a function of c) 
information they act not only to imbue cognitive understanding of the system, but to act as an input-output 
device:  providing a mechanism by which one can provide a system with new input(s) and use the model 
to predict the system’s response (as per the electrical circuit model in Fig. 1C).   A classic illustration from 
Newtonian mechanics is the billiard table with a set of known initial conditions, which include some 
particular configuration of balls in space at time t0.  If one hits a ball from some known direction with some 
known force, our model (e.g., the combined equations that govern the laws of motion) will predict a changed 
configuration of balls in space at some later time ti.  Likewise, in a linear regression: y=b0 + b1x1 + bnxn…+ 
e, we could model the influence of genotype and various environmental factors (x1, x2, …) by fitting the 
optimal set of parameters (b0, b1, …,bn) and measurement error e, in predicting a ten-year-old child’s 
depression at the age of 40.  Modeling the linear regression on one set of individuals, we can then take a 
new child, insert his values for xi , and then test whether our model predicts the new child’s psychological 
state thirty years later, y. 
The utility of a heuristic can be quantified by the degree to which it maximizes the amount of data 
it predicts while minimizing the amount of data it doesn’t predict.  As intuitively illustrated by the billiard 
ball and depression examples, a model’s accuracy can be objectively and quantitatively assessed by the 
distance between the predicted y:  i.e., the predicted configuration of balls or adult behavior at t(i), versus 
the actual y:  i.e., the actual configuration of balls or adult behavior at t(i).  The model’s power can be 
assessed with respect to the diversity of inputs (e.g.,, strikes from different angles and with different degrees 
of force) as well as the length of time i into the future over which the model still continues to hold (e.g., 
accurately predicting the billiard ball configuration ten seconds post-strike versus only one second post-
strike, or predicting clinical trajectories decades, rather than weeks, into the future). To provide a direct 
comparison of these psychiatric models with their counterparts in physics, psychiatric models would first 
need to articulate a precise set of initial conditions (in this case, objective and measurable features for a 
brain or mind’s “state”). These are the biomarkers ubiquitous to neuropsychiatry.  But second, and most 
critically, they would need to predict with some degree of accuracy how the brain or mind would behave 
under a new set of initial conditions as well as how it would evolve from that state over time.  Thus, 
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validating the utility (that is, the accuracy and power) of psychiatric models requires that those models be 
fundamentally prospective, rather than retrospective, providing empirically verifiable predictions, rather 
than descriptions or explanations, for their  narratives.    In logic, this causal validation is described formally 
by modus ponens:  the truth value of if c® e (read as: if c then e) can be tested by measuring that c, therefore 
e while the truth value of c® e  cannot be tested by measuring e, therefore c. The reason for this is that the 
same effect, e, can occur with different, mutually exclusive, causes:  one cannot infer c1 from e if it is also 
the case that: c2® e.   Unlike in physics, prospective model validation in psychiatry is vanishingly rare.  In 
some cases, one can understand that doing so may be difficult:  longitudinal studies following youngsters 
for decades in order to assess the validity of our models (inferring effects from causes) is a project far more 
logistically demanding than taking a cohort of adult subjects and working backwards (inferring causes from 
effects).  However, in testing our neuroimaging models, predictive validation is more tractable, as the same 
circuit can be feasibly probed with multiple inputs with trajectories that evolve over reasonably short 
periods of time.  Thus, if we define a reward circuit on one group of individuals with one particular set of 
inputs, that circuit—in an independent group of individuals—should be able to predict neural dynamics 
over time and in response to a new set of inputs (i.e., not simply the inputs used in estimating the circuits). 
This feature displays the true power of computational psychiatry, since models that remain robust to a 
diversity of inputs would permit parallel  in silica testing of different pharmacological treatment strategies.   
In summary, biomarkers—defined as features reliably associated with some specific state—are 
valuable, because without them we fall prey to the first vulnerability described above (ill-defined variables) 
and cannot describe our initial state.  But those features aren’t models, unless they can tell us something 
about trajectories that extend beyond the data they were originally designed to fit.  In order to do so, they 
can only be tested—and thus validated—with prospective, rather than retrospective, study designs. 
    
  
 
 The limitations of statistics in constructing psychiatric models.   
 As psychiatric models evolved away from the narrative (fundamentally conceptual, explicitly causal) style 
favored by the psychoanalytic tradition, in favor of defining neurobiological features specific to populations 
or conditions, the field began to rely increasingly on statistics to provide data-driven feedback on whether 
those features were likely to be correct.  Models in physics (e.g., F=ma) generally behave with sufficient 
homogeneity that variance in prediction—given the same set of initial conditions—can be attributed solely 
to measurement error.  In contrast, neurobiological biomarkers generally describe their data with fits so 
unreliable that the model’s degree of unreliability also needs to be quantified.  This measure of “how likely 
is it that I’m wrong in identifying a feature” will generally be far too low a standard for models capable of 
predictive validation, particularly within realistically complex systems (i.e., not simply pairs of variables) 
that require multiple interactions.  To illustrate why, let’s assume our previous example of the 
straightforward linear regression (y=b0 + b1x1 + bnxn…+ e), which—to make things simple—initially will 
include only two variables, x and y.  Thus, increases in x (e.g., activation of the amygdala) are associated 
with decreases in y (e.g., deactivation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex).  A fairly typical threshold for 
accepting the reliability of this relationship might be p<0.001, which means that, for a representative fMRI 
sample size of N=50, and r=0.45, our threshold for reliability has been reassuringly met.  Yet a r=0.45 
explains only 20% of the data’s variance, which means that fully 80% of the data’s variance has not been 
fit by the model!   
   Now let’s consider that x and y are almost certainly not the only two protagonists in this system: 
for in fact these two regions are just two components of a longer chain of interactions, xÛyÛz...  Yet, if 
every step of the model contains 80% (or even 5%) error, those errors quickly propagate throughout the 
system with every additional interaction.   While a typical response to increasing statistical reliability of 
our models might be to increase sample sizes, in this case, increasing sample sizes simply makes the 
problem worse.  That’s because, as sample size increases, even less accurate models achieve the threshold 
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of statistical significance.  For example, for N=600, to meet our threshold of p<0.001 only r=0.16 is 
required, thus explaining only 3% of the data’s variance, and therefore not explaining 97% of it.    
   It is important to emphasize that this degree of unreliability is occurring already at the level of 
model estimation (based upon fitting a model to existing data), and not even at the level of model validation 
(using the model to predict future outcomes).  It’s as if we were trying to construct a model of  Newtonian 
mechanics based upon an observed game of billiards, in which our “model” for the relationship between 
each pair of balls was a linear regression characterized by r=0.87 (for neurobiological data, an effect size 
so large as to be almost unheard of), explaining 75% of the variance with respect to each interaction between 
balls.  Yet given that a single strike of the cue will trigger perhaps a dozen subsequent interactions between 
balls, by the time the laws’ error propagates between all dozen interactions, prediction would be so 
unreliable (accurate only 0.7512=3.2% of the time, and thus inaccurate 96.8% of the time) as to make the 
model completely useless.  For modeling systems of interest to neuropsychiatry, the situation is actually 
much more dire.  The brain propagates signals not simply as a linear chain of interactions, but rather within 
circuits that include regulation via feedback.  Depending on the type of feedback, such circuits may amplify 
or reduce input noise in a non-linear fashion, as has been shown experimentally in genetic circuits (Murphy 
et al., 2010; Alon, 2019). 
   In summary, the p-values ubiquitous to neuropsychiatry are designed to describe our level of 
confidence with respect to the existence of relationships and differences between anatomical regions, 
conditions, or population.  As such, they give us reason to believe that there are relationships that might be 
worth modeling but are inadequate in providing the model itself, particularly for the neurobiological control 
systems (e.g., cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical (Maia and Frank, 2011), prefrontal-limbic (Mujica-
Parodi et al., 2017) circuits) most relevant to neuropsychiatry.  That is because linear regressions are only 
able to predict outputs for systems with a specific topology:  one or more parallel direct inputs (Fig. 2A).  
In contrast, most neurobiological responses also involve series (chain) signal pathways (Fig. 2B), as well 
as thresholds/filters, saturation, feedback processes (Fig. 2C) etc. that are fundamentally nonlinear—
systems that if modeled as multiple linear statistical relationships, would quickly propagate errors to levels 
that would all but eliminate predictive power, and therefore the models’ validation.   As we shall see below, 
dynamical systems solve the problem of system-based model validation of neurobiologically relevant 
structures, and thus motivates an alternative approach made possible by computational psychiatry. 
 
Fitting and Validation of Dynamical Systems Models in a Fuzzy World. 
We ended the last section by noting that, in order to capture even the most basic features of brain circuits,  
it is necessary to accommodate topologies fundamentally outside the scope of what can be modeled with 
linear regression.  Thus, each of our neurobiological model’s arrows in Fig. 1B thus is more appropriately 
represented not by a linear regression, but rather by a differential equation, which can express how the 
activation of each node changes in time as a function of the activations of all nodes that interact with it (as 
per the control circuit diagram shown in Fig. 1C). In such a case, the model is comprised of all the linked 
(“coupled”) differential equations and their parameters, and the solution of such a differential equation 
given the initial conditions (typically all activations at time=0) is completely determined by the parameters.  
The task of model fitting is thus to find the best parameters given noisy data. While for linear regression 
the “model” is determined by least squares fit in which we attempt to minimize the distance (“noise”) 
between the regression (“model”) and the data points, in a dynamical system “noise” is quantified somewhat 
differently.  Fig. 3 illustrates the procedure of model fitting and validation for a simple deterministic 
dynamical system that describes a typical interplay between excitatory and inhibitory components of a 
simple circuit with negative feedback.  Fig. 3A reflects the “true” state of the system, but due to 
measurement error we can only obtain Fig. 3B.  From the data in Fig. 3B we can estimate the initial 
conditions and parameters, but because of noise both of these carry uncertainties.  Fig. 3C shows a sample 
of possible solutions given the fitted initial conditions and parameters.  That means that we can validate our 
model by finding that the validation experiments fall in within the set of possible solutions. 
 In dynamical systems, not only measurement noise but also intrinsic noise (reflecting the 
probabilistic nature of biological processes) turns our differential equations into stochastic differential 
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equations, without losing the ability to predict, and therefore to validate, models.  Stochastic differential 
equations are differential equations with noise terms that purposefully introduce randomness into the 
system.  This means that even if we know the exact initial conditions and all the parameters, each solution 
will be slightly different.  Model fitting in this case is illustrated in Fig. 4 using a simple stochastic model 
that describes neural activation fluctuations around a homeostatic steady state value.   Fig. 4A shows a 
measurement that reflects a certain set of parameters and initial conditions.  From this data we can fit the 
most likely initial conditions and parameters, which again are uncertain.  Fig. 4B shows five equivalent 
solutions for which we drew initial conditions and parameters from their respective distributions.  We 
validate the accuracy of our model by determining if new experiments produce trajectories that fall within 
the set of possible solutions provided by our initial fit (Fig. 4C).  To objectively and quantitatively assess 
the model’s utility, its power is determined by the time duration over which actual trajectories continue to 
fall within the set of predicted ones, as well as by the degree to which that consistency continues to exist 
over a diversity of inputs.   
  Importantly, this process of model assessment in the face of noise follows a logic that is Bayesian, 
rather than the “frequentist” statistical approach more common to psychiatric models.  Rather than asking 
the question: What is the probability that our data resulted from the null hypothesis? (as per p-value 
statistics), Bayesian analyses ask: Given the data, what are the values and uncertainties of my model 
parameters? (Sivia and Skilling, 2006).  The corresponding probability distribution of model parameters is 
the posterior distribution.  The standard procedure to obtain the posterior distributions is to express the 
likelihood of the data given the parameters of the model.  By maximizing the likelihood with respect to the 
parameters, we can then identify the most likely parameters of the model and their corresponding 
uncertainties.  
  While this approach may appear to be only semantically different than standard (frequentist) ways 
of analyzing data, in fact the mathematical and conceptual differences are profound, for three reasons.  First, 
unlike standard statistics, it permits accurate estimation of models from timeseries (see e.g., (Strey, 2019)).  
While correlations between timeseries today are ubiquitous within neuroimaging analyses (they form the 
very basis of resting-state analyses, including all “network” results), correlations between time-series are 
inappropriate given that correlations assume the independence of data points and data points within a 
timeseries are, by definition, not independent—an error that artificially minimizes p-values.  A second 
advantage is that posterior probabilities can be used to compare competing models by testing which model 
is more likely to be correct given the available data (Sivia and Skilling, 2006).  Third, a Bayesian approach 
can also help us in assessing the validity of model systems, including nonlinear systems:  when, as described 
earlier in the context of the billiard balls or circuits, we have a long chain of interactions x Þ y Þ z ...  or 
feedback loops.  For such a configuration, we would formulate a model that contains all of the interaction 
parameters between the nodes.  But instead of only considering pairwise interactions, we maximize the 
likelihood of the complete set of activations to find the optimal set of parameters.  This means that 
activations further down the chain constrain and improve the estimates of parameters of earlier interactions, 
preventing the accumulation of errors along the chain. 
 
Building computational psychiatry models.  
In 1609, Johannes Kepler published the first and second law of planetary motions that stated planets travel 
on ellipses and that the area speed of planets is constant.  He derived this law by analyzing observations of 
planetary movements by Tycho Brahe, noting that all observed planets shared these particular properties.  
Later, Newton, in his Principia published in 1687, recognized that Kepler’s laws of planetary motion can 
all be explained by the radial nature and distance dependence of the gravitational force between planets and 
the sun.  Here, Newton reconciled his theory with existing data and analysis by Kepler but simplified the 
model to only requiring a single gravitational force that is consistent with all observations.  In that sense 
Newton’s model was more powerful because it could not only explain, but also predict, more data with 
fewer parameters. 
Unfortunately, there are no generally accepted rules on how to build good models. On the other 
hand there do exist well-established reverse-engineering strategies that are used in systems biology (Csete 
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and Doyle, 2002; Tomlin and Axelrod, 2005), and that can act as a guide.  In recent years, tremendous 
progress has been made in understanding control circuits in cells (both prokaryotic and eukaryotic), a 
success grounded in the application of control systems engineering principles to biology.  Cells, in order to 
survive, need to maintain homeostasis in the face of a chaotic environment, which they accomplish through 
control circuits (negative feedback loops with excitatory and inhibitory control), structures whose modeling 
is well-understood from control systems engineering.  The first success for this approach of searching for 
closed-loop biological control circuits came from bacterial chemotaxis (Alon et al., 1999).  El-Samad et. al 
in 2005 (El-Samad et al., 2005), identified several feedback systems in the heat shock response in cells, and 
the researchers were able by simulations and experiments to decompose the circuit into intuitively 
comprehensible subsystems.  In 2018, Zhang et. al (Zhang and Wang, 2018) developed a fully dynamic 
system for the cell cycle which helped identify the key elements for controlling the cell-cycle speed. 
 Several recent reviews on computational psychiatry(Wang and Krystal, 2014; Huys et al., 2016)  
have focused on how computational methods, using both machine learning and model-based approaches, 
could be used to diagnose mental diseases but also predict treatment strategies.  As one review (Huys et al., 
2016) pointed out, machine learning applied by itself is not a very useful tool for these tasks since the data, 
typically M/EEG or fMRI time series,  have high dimensionality (i.e., the data extend over many space and 
time points).  These data tend to overfit the model, which reduces the model’s ability to predict.  The authors 
suggest that by using known theoretical models of the underlying disorder one could reduce the 
dimensionality of the data (e.g. by reducing the number of brain regions that are contributing to the disorder, 
or by reducing the dynamics of the data into characteristic parameters) and therefore improve the machine 
learning predictability.  This method has been successfully applied to clustering schizophrenia patients into 
subgroups using a working memory task while undergoing fMRI (Brodersen et al., 2014).   
However, if we are correct in our assumption that psychiatry is a system about which we still know 
very little, then we should be wary of committing category errors in constraining our data-driven machine 
learning.  In most cases, the very brain regions and/or the structure of the network responsible for a 
particular psychiatric disease have not been unequivocally validated, making them risky assumptions for 
further model-building.  One strategy for addressing this risk, with a minimum of assumptions, is to pursue 
reverse engineering strategies found in the emerging field of “scientific machine learning,” which seeks to 
identify physical and biological laws from data in an automated fashion(Daniels and Nemenman, 2015; 
Daniels et al., 2019).  In particular, several methods have recently been developed to use high-dimensional 
dynamic (time-series) data to find underlying patterns.  Some of the most promising techniques for potential 
applications in brain research are dynamic mode decomposition (Schmid, 2010; Taira et al., 2017), which 
identifies spatial-dynamical pattern in an automated fashion, and sparse identification of nonlinear 
dynamics (Brunton et al., 2016) which allows the identification of non-linear differential equations that are 
compatible with the data.  The challenge arises when we wish to use data-driven approaches to tell us 
something conceptually meaningful about the biology.  Variational autoencoders are a type of generative 
machine learning that can be used to identify a latent structure underlying complex data (the implicit “rules” 
that govern such data, which can then be used to “generate” predictions, and therefore validation 
experiments, from those rules).  However, it is quite likely that these latent structures are purely 
mathematical entities that do not map onto corresponding biological structures.  
Here, a hybrid approach for circuit discovery may be helpful.  Conceptually, circuit discovery is 
grounded in the observation that a circuit’s output dynamics map onto a differential equation, whose 
mathematical form can itself provide purely data-driven clues as to the system’s mechanistic structure (Fig. 
5).  Thus, using inputs u and outputs y one can use system identification (Ljung, 2014) to generate the  
differential equation that describes the system’s response, known as its transfer function.  Once the transfer 
function has been established, machine learning then can be used to pattern-match the transfer function 
onto a finite set of biologically plausible circuit motifs (e.g., series (Fig. 5A), parallel (Fig. 5B), and 
feedback (Fig. 5C) motifs) that generate equivalent dynamics.    
After defining inputs and outputs, the next step is to refine the model to include three-node 
interactions, as required for closed-loop circuits.  To do so, we need to identify contributions of indirect 
interactions between two brain regions that are caused by a third region interacting with both nodes.  To 
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illustrate, let’s say that we have brain regions A and B and can measure the activation in both.  However, 
there may be a third region C that interacts with both A and B; if so, how much of the A-B interaction is 
due to C?  Since all system interactions can be written mathematically as differential equations, we can 
check at every step not only what the most likely parameters of our model are, but also how well our model 
describes the data. This process of expanding the function and structure to include more and more regions 
will be continued until the model includes all the contributing nodes.  Unlike our statistical example, in 
which every node with one or more inputs must be described by a separate model (i.e., a multiple linear 
regression), our system of coupled differential equations describes the system as a whole, including all of 
its relationships (structure) and interactions (function).  The fact that we have a mathematical description 
of the complete system thus permits us to validate the model, by simulating the temporal response of the 
network with arbitrary inputs, to make predictions that can then be tested against independent data.  In 
doing so, we can incorporate measurement and intrinsic noise sources, including inter-subject variance, 
within the model, by using model validation and Bayesian model selection to adapt the model to a system 
of coupled stochastic (i.e. probabilistic) differential equations. 
 
Computational psychiatry:  constructing circuit-based features for RDoC? 
In 2010, the National Institute of Mental Health launched the initiation of a new psychiatric “grammar,” 
based upon objective, observable, and measurable (e.g., behavioral and biological) features, arranged in 
taxonomies of scale and function.  These research domain criteria, or RDoC, were motivated by the need 
to accelerate integration of disparate research approaches by permitting use of a shared set of features, 
relevant to understanding both normal mental processes as well as their disorders.  RDoC was based upon 
the explicit assumption that “mental disorders are biological disorders involving brain circuits that 
implicate specific domains of cognition, emotion, or behavior.”  As such, circuit regulation may constitute 
one such feature. 
One striking feature of psychiatric neuroimaging results is the fact that they overwhelmingly 
implicate the same three circuits (which partially intersect, and are mutually interacting) for nearly all 
psychiatric disorders:  those that involve processing of threat (e.g., the amydala, hippocampus, 
orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex), reward (e.g., the amygdala, ventral tegmental area, 
locus coeruleus, nucleus accumbens), and perceptual stimuli (e.g., the thalamus, sensory cortex and inferior 
frontal gyrus).  This tendency to implicate the same regions of interest across multiple psychiatric diagnoses 
is one clue that the distinct flavors of mental disorders are probably not rooted simply in a region or its 
connectivity being higher or lower, but rather are likely to implicate distinct modes of dysregulatory control 
processes between them—that is, modeled by dynamical systems.  Importantly, these control processes 
may reflect disruptions in neurotransmitters and/or other molecular mechanisms, and yet be effectively 
dynamically modeled as emergent phenomena at the macroscopic scale.  In dynamical systems, it is 
common to represent the full set of possible physical states within an n-dimensional phase space.  If the 
full spectrum of regulation is represented along an axis designated for each circuit, then—in principle—we 
can position each psychiatric disorder at precise coordinates within such a phase space.  For example, we 
have shown that the anxious-to-reckless spectrum tracks feedback dynamics within the threat-detection and 
perceptual circuits(Mujica-Parodi et al., 2017).  In contrast, depression likely implicates feedback dynamics 
with the reward circuit, and complex disorders such as paranoid schizophrenia and addiction are likely to 
implicate all three circuits and potentially others as well.  Computational psychiatry demonstrates that the 
same circuit can be dysregulated in multiple ways, leading to very different clinical outcomes.  Thus, 
computational psychiatry can expand RDoC’s grammar to move beyond features, to include circuits and 
the dynamical motifs that represent various ways in which their signal processing can be disrupted. 
  
 Conclusions. 
 By using systems of coupled (stochastic) differential equations, rather than linear regressions, 
computational psychiatry is able to model the complex causal chains and feedback loops thought to underlie 
neuropsychiatric circuits.  Thus, computational psychiatry extends the reach of current psychiatric 
conceptual frameworks—not just by applying machine learning towards better discrimination of diagnostic 
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categories—but more profoundly, by providing models that, because they are predictive, now can be 
rigorously assessed for their accuracy and power.  Doing so would extend psychiatry’s intuition that 
disorders result from emergent brain circuits, implicit in the neuroimaging literature, beyond purely 
conceptual schemas to align with fundamental physiological principles of homeostatic regulation and 
feedback found in other areas of “dynamic disease”(Mackey and Glass, 1977). The benefit of this control 
systems approach is that it is sufficiently biomimetic to interface directly with clinical neuroimaging, 
providing a path towards reconciliation of mainstream concepts of “circuits” and “regulation” with more 
mechanistic processes testable with animal probes.  But the most potentially transformative aspect of 
computational psychiatry is clinical.  Dynamical systems are designed to predict future trajectories, and 
thus offer the tantalizing possibility of models that may one day accurately predict the timing of a first 
psychiatric break, the frequency of bipolar cycling, or the response lag between Drug A versus Drug B.  
Thus, computational psychiatry can provide for psychiatry a version of what Newtonian mechanics 
provided for physics:  in this case, robust and useful models for how the brain transitions over time between 
states of health and disease.   
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Figure Legends 
 
 
Figure 1:  Three “models”:  Freudian iceberg model of the human mind, modern neuropsychiatric control circuit model, 
and dynamical systems model of a control circuit.  A) An example of the typical conceptual models historically grounding 
psychiatry, Freud’s theories assume that behavior reflects unconscious influences provided by components of the mind, including 
drives (“id”).  B) Schematic of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical (CBGTC) loop, integrating data from multiple 
neuroimaging (MR-PET) modalities.  Crucially, the CBGTC loop can be treated either as a heuristic (as per the Freudian iceberg 
mind), in which it functions more as a map than a true model; meaning, that it cannot be operationalized to make predictions over 
time, with new inputs.  Or, it can be treated as a graphical representation of a dynamical system of differential equations, as per 
(Frank, 2005) and the PID control circuit shown in C.  C) The dynamical system model is distinguished by the fact that, when 
presented with time-series inputs, it produces simulation outputs.  These output trajectories can be compared to new data in order 
to rigorously assess the model’s validity.  Images adapted from (Maia and Frank, 2011) and Arturo Urquizo (CC-BY 3.0).  
 
 
Figure 2:  Linear regressions are only capable of modeling neurobiological models with a very specific topology: parallel 
inputs.  In contrast to parallel inputs (A), most neurobiological circuits of relevance to psychiatry also require serial (B) and 
feedback (B) components, structures that could lead to an explosion of error propagation using standard statistical methods. 
Stochastic dynamical systems, which operate as a system of coupled differential equations, are able to capture all neurobiologically-
relevant circuit topologies while also providing confidence intervals for not only each individual parameter but also the model as a 
whole.  
 
 
Figure 3: Example of how to fit and validate a model in the face of measurement noise.  Here we present a simple deterministic 
dynamical system, Lotka-Volterra (LV), that can be used to describe interplay between excitatory and inhibitory components of a 
neural circuit with negative feedback. A) Time course of a specific solution of the LV differential equations (red = excitatory and 
blue = inhibitory activation). B) Time course of (A) with added Poisson noise to simulate a realistic data set.  C) Using (B) as data, 
we estimated the model parameters of the LV model and plotted a sample of the possible solutions given the uncertainties of the 
parameters.  It is important to remember that in the real world we would only see (B) and (C) since the true behavior (A) is masked 
by measurement error. 
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Figure 4: Example of how to model/build a model with intrinsic stochasticity.  Here we present a stochastic dynamical system 
that could be used to model the brain activity of a single node in the resting-state-network (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process 
(Strey, 2019)).  A) A particular solution of the OU process with amplitude=1, and relaxation time = 1 sec.  B) From the data on the 
left, we estimated the model parameters of the OU process and created a set of sample solutions.  Because of the stochastic nature 
of the OU process none of the solutions look identical even though their parameters are the same.  The process of model validation 
determines how likely it is that the data of a validation experiment could have originated from the fitted parameters, an assessment 
that—due to its logical structure—must be determined using Bayesian, rather than frequentist, statistical tests.  
 
 
Figure 5:  Circuit Discovery.  To illustrate how transfer function structure changes with different circuit topologies, we show 
three transfer functions, each of which corresponds to a different kind of  “motif,” with series (A), parallel (B), and feedback (C) 
connections.  By using pairs of inputs (u) and outputs (y) to obtain their transfer function (system identification), we can 
systematically infer circuit topology.  A hybrid version uses machine learning to pattern-match data dynamics to the canonical 
dynamics produced by each motif.  This type of data-driven “reverse engineering” has been used successfully across science and 
engineering domains, including systems biology (Bongard and Lipson, 2007; Luo et al., 2010; Brunton et al., 2016). 
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